

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA  
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION**

DANIEL SAMUEL JASON,

Movant,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

No. C11-0035-LRR  
No. CR09-0087-LRR

ORDER

---

This matter appears before the court on several pleadings filed either by Daniel Samuel Jason (“the movant”) or the government: the movant’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (docket no. 1), filed March 23, 2011, the government’s answer (docket no. 3), filed April 15, 2011, the movant’s brief (docket no. 4), filed April 25, 2011, the movant’s reply (docket no. 5), filed May 19, 2011, the movant’s motion to amend (docket no. 6), filed May 19, 2011, the movant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing (docket no. 7), filed May 19, 2011, the movant’s motion to appoint counsel (docket no. 8), filed May 19, 2011, and the movant’s motion for ruling (docket no. 9), filed June 10, 2011.

With respect to the motion for ruling, the court finds that it is able to address the merits of the movant’s claims without briefing and to resolve the movant’s pending motions without requiring the government to respond. Because the record is sufficient to resolve this action, the motion for ruling (docket no. 9) shall be granted. Concerning the movant’s motion to amend, the court deems it appropriate to consider the additional claims that he asserts. *Cf. United States v. Craycraft*, 167 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding an otherwise untimely amendment to a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion does not relate back to a timely filed motion when the original claims are distinctly separate from

the claims in the amendment); *see also Mandacina v. United States*, 328 F.3d 995, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing *Craycraft*, 167 F.3d at 457); *Moore v. United States*, 173 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussing *Craycraft*, 167 F.3d at 456-57). Accordingly, the movant's motion to amend (docket no. 6) shall be granted. Further, appointment of counsel is based on multiple factors, including the complexity of the case, and, although the court does appoint attorneys in actions that arise under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, it is not required to appoint an attorney. *See Davis v. Scott*, 94 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1996) (setting forth factors to be considered for appointment of counsel in civil case); *Abdullah v. Gunter*, 949 F.2d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); *Wiggins v. Sargent*, 753 F.2d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating an indigent litigant enjoys neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil case); *Day v. United States*, 428 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1970) ("The Sixth Amendment does not extend to persons seeking post conviction relief." (citing *Baker v. United States*, 334 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1964))). Here, the record establishes that the movant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty pursuant to an agreement that he entered into with the government. In light of the record that already exists and the fact that the claims asserted by the movant are straightforward and lack complexity, the court concludes that appointment of counsel is not warranted. Accordingly, the movant's motion to appoint counsel (docket no. 8) shall be denied.

A district court is given discretion in determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. *See United States v. Oldham*, 787 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1986). In exercising that discretion, the district court must determine whether the alleged facts, if true, entitle the movant to relief. *See Payne v. United States*, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996). "Accordingly, [a district court may summarily dismiss a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 without an evidentiary hearing] if (1) the . . . allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle the [movant] to relief, or (2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently

incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.” *Engelen v. United States*, 68 F.3d 238, 240-41 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); *see also Delgado v. United States*, 162 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary where allegations, even if true, do not warrant relief or allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record or lack factual evidence and rely on conclusive statements); *United States v. Hester*, 489 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1973) (stating that no evidentiary hearing is necessary where the files and records of the case demonstrate that relief is unavailable or where the motion is based on a question of law). Stated differently, a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion can be dismissed without a hearing where “the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255; *see also Standing Bear v. United States*, 68 F.3d 271, 272 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

The court concludes that it is able to resolve the movant’s claims from the record. *See Rogers v. United States*, 1 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding “[a]ll of the information that the court needed to make its decision with regard to [the movant’s] claims was included in the record . . . .” and, therefore, the court “was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing”) (citing Rule Governing Section 2255 Proceedings 8(a) and *United States v. Raddatz*, 447 U.S. 667, 674, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1980)). The evidence of record conclusively demonstrates that the movant is not entitled to the relief sought. Specifically, the record indicates that the movant’s claims are meritless. Consequently, the court shall deny the movant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing (docket no. 7).

With respect to the merits of the movant’s claims, the court thoroughly reviewed the record and finds that the denial of the movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion comports with the Constitution, results in no “miscarriage of justice” and is consistent with the “rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” *Hill v. United States*, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962); *see also United States v. Apfel*, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076

(8th Cir. 1996) (“Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” (citing *Poor Thunder v. United States*, 810 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1987))). The court concludes that, to the extent he does not allege ineffective assistance of counsel, his claims are procedurally defaulted and/or waived under the terms of his plea agreement. Further, the court concludes that the conduct of counsel fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance, *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and counsel’s performance did not prejudice the movant’s defense, *id.* at 692-94. The record indicates that the movant benefitted tremendously from decisions that he and defense counsel made. The movant’s mistaken beliefs as to the law do not establish that counsel performed deficiently or prejudiced him in any way. Nothing the movant states in support of his request for relief leads the court to conclude that a violation of the Sixth Amendment occurred. Lastly, the court concludes that no due process violation occurred and the movant’s assertions regarding relevant conduct, threats he made, sentencing enhancements he received, evidence presented at the time of his sentencing hearing, the plea agreement, the terms of supervision, the interstate nexus, the appeal waiver and the prosecutor’s role in the proceedings are baseless.

In sum, the alleged errors that are asserted by the movant do not warrant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The movant’s claims are procedurally defaulted, waived, meritless and/or frivolous. Based on the foregoing, the movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion shall be denied.

In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding before a district judge, the final order is subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A district court possesses the authority to issue certificates of appealability

under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). *See Tiedeman v. Benson*, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability may issue only if a movant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003); *Garrett v. United States*, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2000); *Carter v. Hopkins*, 151 F.3d 872, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1998); *Cox v. Norris*, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997); *Tiedeman*, 122 F.3d at 523. To make such a showing, the issues must be debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings. *Cox*, 133 F.3d at 569 (citing *Flieger v. Delo*, 16 F.3d 878, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1994)); *see also Miller-El*, 537 U.S. at 335-36 (reiterating standard).

Courts reject constitutional claims either on the merits or on procedural grounds. “[W]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy [28 U.S.C.] § 2253(c) is straightforward: the [movant] must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” *Miller-El*, 537 U.S. at 338 (quoting *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000)). When a federal habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim, “the [movant must show], at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” *See Slack*, 529 U.S. at 484.


Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, the court finds that the movant failed to make the requisite “substantial showing” with respect to the claims that he raised in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). Because he does not present a question of substance for appellate review, there is no reason to grant a certificate of appealability. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability

shall be denied. If he desires further review of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the movant may request issuance of the certificate of appealability by a circuit judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in accordance with *Tiedeman*, 122 F.3d at 520-22.

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:**

- 1) The movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion (docket no. 1) is denied.
- 2) A certificate of appealability is denied.
- 3) The movant's motion to amend (docket no. 6) is granted.
- 4) The movant's motion for an evidentiary hearing (docket no. 7) is denied.
- 5) The movant's motion to appoint counsel (docket no. 8) is denied.
- 6) The movant's motion for ruling (docket no. 9) is granted.
- 7) The clerk's office is directed to enter judgment in favor of the government.

**DATED** this 14th day of June, 2012.

  
LINDA R. READE  
CHIEF JUDGE, U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA